Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks by DO, Quoc-Anh et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
5-2012
Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Value of Political
Connections in Social Networks
Quoc-Anh DO
Singapore Management University, qa.quocanhdo@gmail.com
Yen Teik LEE
Singapore Management University, yt.lee.2006@smu.edu.sg
Bang Dang NGUYEN
University of Cambridge
Kieu-Trang NGUYEN
Indiana University at Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Finance Commons, and the Political Science
Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
DO, Quoc-Anh; LEE, Yen Teik; NGUYEN, Bang Dang; and NGUYEN, Kieu-Trang. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Value of Political
Connections in Social Networks. (2012). 1-53. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1388
 
 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, SMU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of Sight, Out of Mind: 
The Value of Political Connections in Social 
Networks 
 
Quoc-Anh Do, Yen-Teik Lee,  
Bang Dang Nguyen & Kieu-Trang Nguyen 
 
May 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Paper No. 22 - 2012 
 smu economics & statistics 
working paper series 
 
1 
 
Out of Sight, Out of Mind:  
The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks* 
 
Quoc-Anh Do† 
Singapore Management University 
 
Bang Dang Nguyen‡ 
University of Cambridge 
 
Yen-Teik Lee§ 
Singapore Management University 
 
Kieu-Trang Nguyen** 
Indiana University at Bloomington 
 
 
This draft: May 2012 
First draft: February 2011 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of social-network based political connections 
on firm value. We focus on the networks of university classmates and alumni among 
directors of U.S. public firms and congressmen. Comparing firms connected to elected 
versus defeated politicians in the Regression Discontinuity Design of close elections 
from 2000 to 2008, we provide evidence that political connections enhance firm value. 
However, the value of political connections varies in a more complex way than expected. 
While connections to powerful members of the Senate generate strong positive impact 
on firm value, connections to newly elected congressmen are less valuable to firms than 
connections to state-level politicians defeated in those elections. As a result, a director’s 
connection to an elected congressman causes a Weighted Average Treatment Effect on 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of -2.65% surrounding the election date. Our results are 
robust and consistent through various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, 
with different outcome measures and social network definitions, and across many 
subsamples. Overall, our study identifies the value of political connections through social 
networks, uncovers its variation across different politicians’ backgrounds, and stresses 
the importance of state-level political connections. 
 
Keywords: Social network; political connection; close election; regression 
discontinuity design; firm value; state-level politics. 
JEL Classifications: D72, D73, D85, G3, G10, G11, G14, G30, C21 
 
                                                 
* We thank many friends and colleagues, and the seminar participants at City University of Hong Kong, Ecole Polytechnique, HEC, Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, INSEAD, Manchester Business School, 
National University of Singapore Business School, Paris School of Economics, Sciences Po, Singapore Management University School of 
Economics and Lee Kong Chian Business School, THEMA (Université Cergy-Pontoise), Tufts University, University of Cambridge Judge 
Business School and Economics Department, University of Exeter Business School, University of Reading Henley Business School, University of 
Warwick and conference participants at the Asian Conference on Applied Microeconomics/Econometrics at Academia Sinica, European Finance 
Association Meeting 2011, of the Econometric Society Meetings (Europe 2011, Asia 2011, North America Summer 2011 and Winter 2012), CAF 
Summer Research Conference in Finance at the Indian School of Business 2011, Asian Finance Association Meeting 2011, Journées Louis-André 
Gérard-Varet on Public Economics 2011, SMU-ESSEC Workshop on Financial Economics 2011, and University of Cambridge Finance 
Research Day 2011 for helpful comments, and for thoughtful insights and suggestions. We thank Zeng Huaxia, Liu Shouwei, Nguyen Phu Binh, 
Lan Lan for invaluable research assistance. Do acknowledges financial support from the Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics, 
Singapore Management University. All errors remain our own. 
†  School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178903. Tel: (+65) 6828 1916; Fax: (+65) 6828 0833; Email: 
quocanhdo@smu.edu.sg. 
‡ Finance and Accounting Group, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, U.K. Tel: (+44) 1223 760 740; Fax: 
(+44) 1223 339 701; Email: b.nguyen@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
§  Department of Finance, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899. E-mail: 
yt.lee.2006@smu.edu.sg. 
** SPEA, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47401, U.S.A. Email: trknguye@indiana.edu. 
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of political connections on firms has attracted a growing body of economic 
and finance literature. Political connections are reported to affect firm value, access to credit, 
business with government, corporate taxation, and regulatory oversight, in many parts of the 
world, especially where institutions are weak and politicians have much discretion and little 
accountability.1 The existence of political influences on firms paves way to rent-seeking activities, 
with long-term detrimental effects on market efficiency, political accountability and economic 
growth.2 In the United States, where institutions rank among the best in the world,3 the evidence 
of the value of political connections is mixed, with positive estimates (Jayachandran 2006, Knight 
2007, Goldman et al. 2009, Acemoglu et al. 2010), as well as estimates indistinguishable from 
zero (Fisman et al. 2006). 
This paper consolidates and enriches the body of empirical evidence on the impact of 
political connections in the U.S. by using novel methods to address the major challenges faced 
by the extant literature. First, we extend beyond event studies of very specific cases by 
broadening the definition of political connections to social relations between politicians and 
corporate directors based on their educational backgrounds. Second, we address key 
identification problems in the empirics of social interactions by using the Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) of close elections to Congress, subjected to thorough robustness 
checks with additional fixed effects and control variables. 
Our first objective is to address the social relations between politicians and firms beyond 
direct family ties and share ownerships, which are very rare among American congressmen. 
While social connections could be carefully measured by coordination games in laboratory setups 
(e.g., Leider et al. 2009) or by extensive field surveys (e.g., Conley and Udry 2010), both methods 
are prohibitively costly to apply in our context.4 Instead, we use the social networks defined by 
                                                 
1  The literature has covered Indonesia (Fisman 2001), Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton 2003), Pakistan 
(Khwaja and Mian 2005), Brazil (Claessens et al. 2008), France (Bertrand et al. 2008), Thailand (Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang 2009), Taiwan (Imai and Shelton 2010), and cross-country evidence (Faccio 2006, Faccio et al. 
2006), , among others. 
2 See for instance Shleifer and Vishny (2002), chapters 3-5 and 8-10, for discussions on political rent-
seeking and its negative impacts on efficiency and growth. 
3 From 2000 to 2008, the U.S. rank consistently in the world’s first decile in terms of control of corruption, 
rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness (by average scores of the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators, Kaufman et al. 2011.) 
4 See the surveys on social networks by Marsden (1990), Rauch (2001), Ioannides and Loury (2004), 
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former classmates in tertiary education, an important type of social networks in the U.S.5 This 
measurement can be clearly and unambiguously defined based on publicly available information 
on educational backgrounds of all politicians and directors, and covers a sample much more 
representative than connections specific to a few politicians (such as in Acemoglu et al. 2010, 
and Fisman et al. 2006.) We abstract from political connections based on campaign contributions, 
treated for instance by Cooper et al. (2011), as we find it difficult to establish clear links between 
specific firms and politicians based on these contributions in the U.S. During our period of study 
firms cannot contribute to political candidates, except in setting up political action committees to 
receive donations from its employees, often to both major parties. Even those committees often 
channel the contributed funds to larger-scale committees, and only a small fraction of those 
funds goes to specific candidates’ campaigns.6 
Our second objective is to solve the identification problem related to connections 
between politicians and firms. Many unobservable characteristics of politicians and firms can 
influence a political link (or the measure thereof) and the outcomes at the same time, thereby 
confounding the effect we want to attribute to social network connections.7 In specific contexts, 
event studies using arguably exogenous news and event probabilities from prediction markets 
may provide partial solutions to this issue (see, for instance, Snowberg et al. 2007, or Fisman 
2001). However, the reliance on specific events may compromise the generalizability of the 
empirical findings. 
Our novel approach consists of identifying the effect of social connections of politicians 
and directors by using politicians’ close elections. Lee (2008) showed that close elections can be 
considered a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a natural experiment that produces near-
randomized-trial identification with extremely good internal validity. That is, a connection to a 
politician elected to office by a small margin is almost identical to a connection to one defeated 
by a small margin, and can be considered as a randomized experiment around the threshold. 
Moreover, Lee and Lemieux (2010) also show that the estimated effect is a Weighted Average 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jackson (2009), and Allen and Babus (2009) for more network definitions and measurements. 
5 The social networks of former classmates have been explored, and their importance stressed, inter alia, by 
Cohen et al. (2008) and Fracassi (2009) in the context of American educational institutions, Bertrand et al. (2008), 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2012), and Nguyen (2012) in France, and Lerner and Malmendier (2011) and Shue (2011) 
for Harvard Business School alumni. In the U.S., educational institutions received as much as $41.67 billion in 2010, 
or 14% of all charitable donations, second only to religious organizations (the Giving USA Foundation, 2011.) 
6 Our results are not affected when controlled for each politician’s total campaign contributions.  
7 See the surveys by Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) and Blume et al. (2011) on the identification challenge 
regarding social interactions. 
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Treatment Effect (WATE), thus being generalizable to the sample of all politicians with a 
nonzero chance of experiencing a close election. The existing literature has principally used the 
RDD of close elections with politicians’ behaviors and outcomes, such as election advantage, roll 
call votes or wealth accumulation (surveyed by Lee and Lemieux 2010); to our knowledge, we are 
the first to apply close election RDD to outcomes of firms linked to politicians. This can pave 
way for further applications of RDD in corporate finance, a hitherto underexploited possibility.8 
The remaining identification challenge in social networks is the confoundedness of 
homophily. Coined by sociologists,9 “homophily” refers to the phenomenon that people sharing 
the same characteristics are more likely to connect, thus confounding the effect of connections 
with the effect of shared characteristics. Earlier works using the social network of educational 
backgrounds (Cohen et al. 2008, Fracassi 2009) have distinguished between former classmate 
networks and alumni networks to highlight the effect of connections as opposed to that of 
shared characteristics. By including both politicians and directors, we are able to push this 
methodology further: we introduce school fixed effects, thus identifying the effect of political 
connections by variations over time (school fixed effects are unidentifiable in earlier works based 
solely on the connections of businessmen). We can thus ascertain that the discovered effects 
come from social connections, not homophily. 
We obtain data on elections from 2000 to 2008 from the Federal Election Commission, 
from which we filter in only elections of a winning margin within 5% between the two 
frontrunners. We manually collect details of all politicians’ educational backgrounds from the 
web archives of their campaigns, a process made difficult by the search for less prominent 
defeated candidates. On the director side, we obtain past education history for directors of 
public firms in the U.S. from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. We then form all 
pairs between close-election candidates (elected or defeated) and directors who graduated from 
the same educational institution (same campus) within one year of each other, and link each pair 
to the stock performance of the firm around the date of the politician’s close election. Each 
observation thus matches a firm’s cumulative abnormal return on the event window to the win 
or loss status of the candidate who shares education background with a director of the firm. 
We run a regression of cumulative abnormal returns of stock prices of connected firms 
on a Win/Loss dummy with semi-parametric controls as required in a RDD. This regression 
equation provides an estimate of the stock-market value of a new connection to a politician in 
                                                 
8 Exceptions include Chava and Roberts (2008), Cuñat et al. (2012), Kerr et al. (2011). 
9 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook’s (2001) survey. 
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Congress. As shown in Lee and Lemieux (2010), the RDD of close elections produces a 
consistent, unconfounded estimate of the effect of the treatment. In this context, a treated firm’s 
connected politician gets elected to Congress, while a control firm’s connected politician is 
defeated.  This estimate is in fact as good as a randomized experiment around the vote share 
threshold of 50%, and can account for all confounding factors prior to the event, be they 
observable or unobservable. Therefore, instead of running regressions trying to control for all 
relevant covariates, we can focus our empirical work on a single regression, while varying the 
subsample used in the regression. 
In the terminology coined by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we estimate the Weighted 
Average Treatment Effect (WATE), where the weight of each observation is the probability that 
a politician experiences a very close election. While some politicians are less likely to have that 
experience than others, the inclusion of highly visible politicians such as John Ashcroft or Walter 
Mondale in our sample implies that our estimate can cover a very large share of the population 
of politicians and is therefore generalizable, unlike previous interpretations of RDD which are 
considered only applicable to the threshold value. Taken together, our estimate identifies a 
treatment effect that can shed light on social connections between Congressmen and corporate 
directors. 
We obtain a variety of treatment effects, ranging from positive 7.43% for incumbent 
members of the powerful Appropriations Committees, to a negative 3.24% for challengers, to an 
overall effect of negative 2.65% during the event window from one day before to five days after 
the election. This result indicates that having a connected politician in Congress significantly 
decreases firm value by 2.65% on average and that the average effect is dominated by the 
negative value effect of challengers. Our results are robust through many specifications, 
parametric and nonparametric, with different measures of outcomes, under different definitions 
of the social network (former classmates or alumni), and across many subsamples. 
We interpret the seemingly counterintuitive negative impact of political connections 
results as follows. The connected politician is already providing benefits to the firm at state level, 
where he may have more time and focus for business deals, and faces less institutional and public 
checks and balances. If he is elected to federal office, the firm is expected to get less benefit, 
whereas if he is defeated, he will most likely remain as active in state politics, probably return to 
his previous position and strengthen his role in the state party apparatus. As a result, the 
estimated treatment effect is negative. We empirically test and confirm three implied predictions. 
First, the value loss effect is present for politicians coming from state, not for those from federal 
politics. Second, the effect is stronger for states with lower institutional quality and smaller firms. 
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Third, firm activities, measured by local newspapers’ citations of firm names, decrease in elected 
politicians’ states, compared to defeated politicians’. Trading volume also increased significantly 
more for the stocks in our sample around election time, implying that the financial market pays 
particular attention to those events. Our result is thus interpreted as evidence of a higher value of 
connections for politicians at the state level than for politicians at the federal level. 
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on political connections. The 
first contribution is our solution to the identification problem. In the existing literature, the study 
of political events, assumed as independent of political connections, has perhaps yielded the 
most convincing results. Knight (2007), Goldman et al. (2008, 2009),and  Mattozzi (2008) exploit 
close elections in presidential races in the U.S.; Roberts (1990), Jayachandran (2006),Fisman et al. 
(2006), and Acemoglu et al. (2010) use news and events related to prominent American 
politicians; while Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009), Ferguson and Voth (2008), and Imai and Shelton (2010) treat 
politically important events in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Nazi Germany, and Taiwan. This 
strategy avoids the direct reverse causation channel, but, as discussed by Snowberg et al. (2008), 
many caveats persist, notably the unobserved prior probability of each event. The use of 
prediction markets as a helpful fix is unfortunately only limited to important events such as 
American presidential elections, and thus restrict the scope and undermine the generalizability of 
such analysis. 
Other articles using non-political firm-related events such as appointments of directors 
(Faccio 2006, Goldman et al. 2009), bailouts (Faccio et al. 2006), IPOs (Fan et al. 2007, Francis 
et al. 2009) are subject to the endogeneity concern that these events are partly triggered by 
certain unobservable characteristics of the firms. Khwaja and Mian (2005), Dinç (2005), Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Bertrand et al. (2008), Claessens et al. (2008), Li et al. (2008), and 
Boubakri et al. (2009) rely on fixed effects and/or difference-in-difference strategies, and are 
liable to confounding biases induced by time-varying characteristics of firms or 
politicians/political parties. 
Despite extensive robustness checks of causality in prior literature, the endogeneity of 
political connections remains a thorny issue. Even in the best event-study setups with perfect 
measures of prior probabilities of events, it is hard to rule out the possibility of unobserved firm 
characteristics affecting both a firm’s outcome and political connections (exceptions include 
randomized assignments to social networks as studied by Lerner and Malmendier 2011, and Shue 
2011.) For instance, a defense technology firm can recruit a former secretary of defense because 
of his expertise in defense technologies, and will likely benefit from the political success of his 
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pro-war former party fellow members, without this effect deriving from a “political connection,” 
as previously defined. Our framework deals adequately with both the endogeneity of the 
connected politician and the selection bias in networks due to homophily, providing a powerful 
internal validity of the empirical results. Moreover, the estimated effect is a WATE across the 
sample of all politicians susceptible to experiencing a close election, and across sampled firms, 
which are comparable to Compustat’s universe, therefore enforcing the external validity of the 
estimate. 
Our second contribution is the finding of a large variation in the value of political 
connection and the implied emphasis on state-level political connections. While the negative 
average estimated value of connection to congressmen appears at first glance counterintuitive, it 
does not contradict the existing literature on the positive value of political connections (e.g., 
Fisman, 2001, Faccio, 2006, Goldman et al. 2008). We argue that it actually results from the 
firm’s lost benefits when the connected politician moves away from state politics. This empirical 
finding is consistent with Fisman et al. (2006) who find that, on average, firms do not enjoy 
financial benefits from their connections to Vice President Dick Cheney while he is in office. 
Our result points to the remarkable difference in the institutional environments between the 
federal and state levels in the U.S., implying very different values of political connections, and 
highlights the importance of state-level political connections, which calls for further attention on 
state-level political research and institution design. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology. 
Section 3 provides data description. Section 4 reports the major empirical results and robustness 
checks. Section 5 discusses and explains the findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IDENTIFICATION 
Evidence of the impact of a political connection on firm value is subject to two types of 
endogeneity biases. The first bias comes from the endogeneity of the “political” part in “political 
connection.” The estimated effect could reflect (i) a reverse causation channel when a well-
performing firm may be able to help its connected politicians win elections, or (ii) an omitted 
variable bias when connected firms and politicians are affected by the same unobservable factor, 
such as a shift in public opinion. The second bias comes from the endogenous determination of 
the “connection,” usually termed as the problem of homophily when individuals are connected 
because of similarity. 
The endogeneity bias is best eliminated with a randomization of the assignment of a 
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politician to office: if the politician is chosen randomly, there is no concern of either the reverse 
causation of firm value changes or the influence of some omitted variables. In practice, it is hard 
to find a randomized experiment on political connection. 
David Lee’s (2008) pioneering work on Regression Discontinuity Designs points out 
that, under the key assumption that candidates are unable to precisely manipulate the result of 
the election, the event of winning close to the vote threshold of 50% is randomized between the 
top two runners as though in a randomized experiment. Intuitively, as candidates only have 
imprecise control over the assignment of win or loss, everyone has approximately the same 
probability of getting a vote share of just above or just below 50% – similar to a coin flip. In 
other words, conditional on the election being close, the incidence of winning or losing is 
independent of all observable and unobservable characteristics of the politician before the 
election. The RDD thus allows an estimation of the average treatment effect of connections to 
elected politicians versus defeated politicians without any reverse causation or omitted variable 
bias, ensuring the internal validity of the results. 
On their external validity, the results from the RDD are generalizable. Lee and Lemieux 
(2010) point out that the RDD estimate is not only informative for close elections but also for 
others. The estimate can be interpreted as a Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE) of 
being politically connected, where each politician’s weight is her ex ante likelihood to be in a 
close election. This likelihood is nontrivial for most American politicians. Even very powerful 
politicians are not immune to close elections, as the Senate majority leader Harry Reid 
experienced in 2010. On the other hand, there is no particularity in firms included in our sample, 
as we will show in Section 3 that our sample of firms is very similar to the Compustat universe. 
2.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
We follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) in designing two main econometric specifications to 
estimate the effect of political connection. In our context, each observation represents a 
connection between a close-election top-two candidate and a connected firm’s director through a 
specific university program for a given election year. The dependent variable is the 
corresponding firm’s stock price cumulated abnormal return in a window around the election 
day that year. The treatment variable is an indicator variable whether the connected politician 
wins or loses that race. 
The first specification consists of an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the 
treatment variable, controlling for the vote shares of elected politicians and defeated politicians, 
where the sample is limited to all races with less than 5% vote margin. That is, we obtain the 
OLS estimate ߚመ  in the following equation, where ܸ ௜ܵ stands for vote share: 
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ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߚܹ݅݊ܮ݋ݏ݁௜ ൅ ߜௐܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ஹହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߜ௅ܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ழହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߝ௜. 
Standard errors are calculated from the OLS regression, and are clustered at the politician 
level for each election. In our robustness checks, we also include a cubic polynomial of the vote 
shares, as well as other levels of clustering. 
The second specification uses nonparametric regressions of the outcome variable on the 
treatment variable on two separate subsamples, of elected politicians and of runners-up. 
Predictions of the outcome variable are calculated at the threshold of 50% for each sample, and 
their difference is reported. Technically, we use the nonparametric local cubic polynomial 
regression of the equation: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ܨሺܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ 
on the subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൏ 50%  to estimate the function ܨ෠ି ሺ. ሻ  and on the 
subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൐ 50% to obtain ܨ෠ାሺ. ሻ . The estimated effect is calculated as 
ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ െ ܨ෠ି ሺ50%ሻ.
10 
2.1. OTHER ISSUES 
By defining connections by all pairs of classmates, we may raise doubts about the realistic 
nature of those connections, as most people have only a small number of friends even among 
classmates (see, for instance, Leider et al. 2009). Yet this should not be a concern to the 
significance of our results. The measurement errors in this case imply that the effect of real 
friendships is nuanced by many non-friends classmate connections, thus produce an attenuation 
bias that reduces the absolute size of the estimate and its statistical significance. The effect of real 
friendships can thus be even larger than those found in this paper. On the other hand, classmate 
connections can be primordial in the development of relationships after college or graduate 
school by providing common ground in communication and mutual trust as well as common 
access to the same social network. In that sense, former classmates are much more likely to later 
develop a strong connection, even if they not close friends while in college or graduate school. In 
fact, several recent papers have shown the strength of this measurement of connections in many 
contexts (Cohen et al. 2008, Fracassi 2009, and Nguyen 2012). 
While the links between firms and elected congressmen are identified as an almost-
random treatment in our context, the full social networks of classmates and alumni, including 
                                                 
10The standard error is calculated as a standard error of the difference of two independent variables, as the 
two subsamples are completely separate from one another. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are not shown. In each 
local polynomial regression, the clusters near the threshold are very similar to single observations, therefore cluster-
adjusted standard errors will not differ much from unclustered ones. 
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links to both elected and defeated congressmen, are taken as exogenously given. This definition 
of social network, while ruling out direct reverse causality (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008), still tolerates 
the problem of homophily (McPherson et al. 2001). Accordingly, future politicians and directors 
sharing similar characteristics and preferences may have been drawn together at the same 
university; decades later the elected politician may enact policies in favor of these same 
characteristics, on which the director’s firm can profit, without passing through the social 
network channel. In essence, unobservable factors could determine connections, politician’s 
preferences, firm’s activities, and market reaction to elections (i.e., value is only affected when 
the similar politician is elected). For example, if a politician and a director went to a university 
that specializes in military studies, then the election of the former has the potential to affect the 
latter’s firm value through new defense policies, rather than through the social network. In sum, 
identification problems of the effect in question emerge when certain unobservables influence 
both the outcomes at the firm level and the explanatory variable of political connection. While 
the RDD does identify the effect of “political connection” as we define it, this effect may not be 
the fruit of social network mechanisms but may instead result from common characteristics. 
Our setup allows for a simple solution: the common, time-invariant characteristics of 
school cohorts can be captured by school fixed effects. The estimated effect is then identified 
across years and by individuals who went to more than one school. As it turns out, the results are 
not much affected by the inclusion of school fixed effects, hence homophily is not a prevalent 
problem for our estimation. 
On the concern of how political connections are translated into stock price reactions, we 
note that our framework which estimates an average stock price reaction does not requires that 
all potential investors know about the connection between a politician and a firm through 
politician-director educational links and/or the outcome of a close election. A fraction of 
investors who follow related firms might be sufficient to create the stock price impact. At the 
local level, local investors might follow more closely the political connections to local firms.     
In summary, our research design identifies and consistently estimates the WATE of 
being connected to a politician in Congress, where the effect is averaged with weights over the 
sample of all politicians who stand a chance of experiencing a close election, and all firms in 
Compustat. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We build our sample using data from a few sources. First, we collect the federal election 
results from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website. Every two years, FEC publishes 
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certified federal election results compiled from each state’s election office and other official 
sources. The published data contains information on primary, runoff, and general election results 
for the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and, when applicable, the U.S. President. 
For each election, we identify the candidate finishing first and second and calculate the margin of 
votes between the top two candidates. A close election is specified by a margin of votes of less 
than 5%. 
As reported in Panel A of Table D1, we identify 128 close elections for U.S. Senate (23 
elections) and Congress (105 elections) between 2000 and 2008. The average Win/Loss margin 
across all election is 2.54% (2.42% with Senate elections and 2.57% with House of 
Representatives elections). Panel B shows summary statistics of elections and politicians per year. 
The average annual number of elections is 26 (with a maximum of 36, and minimum of 15). Our 
sample elections involve on average 89 politicians per year, with a maximum of 112 and a 
minimum of 61. The average number of connected firms per year is 362. 
[Insert Table D1 Here] 
We hand-collect the biographical record of these elections using Marquis Who’s Who 
biographies, which contain active and inactive biographies from the Who’s Who publications. Our 
scope of search includes biographies in (i) Who’s Who in American Politics, (ii) Member Biographical 
Profiles – Current Congress, (iii) World Almanac of U.S. Politics, and (iv) The Almanac of American 
Politics. For each candidate, Who’s Who biographies provide a brief vita, including the candidate’s 
employment history, all undergraduate and graduate degrees attained, the year in which those 
degrees were awarded, and the awarding institution. Most of the biographies for our sample are 
available in Who’s Who. To complete our biographies, we use Library of Congress Web Archives, 
Internet Archives, politicians’ archived websites, and other sources on the World Wide Web. We 
retain entries for which we can positively identify the politician.  
We next obtain biographical information and past education history for directors and 
senior company officers from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data details 
the relational links among board directors and senior company officers for both active and 
inactive firms by cross-referencing these directors’ and officers’ employment history, educational 
background, and professional qualifications. In particular, the data contains current and past 
roles of each official in a company with start and end date (year), all undergraduate and graduate 
degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding institution. We 
restrict our sample to board directors in U.S. publicly listed firms. 
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We construct our social network measure through educational institutions.11 We define a 
political connection as a link between a firm’s director and an election candidate who graduate 
from the same university program within a year. We thereby match institutions and degrees on 
Who’s Who biographies and BoardEx. Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), we group 
the degrees into six categories: (i) business school (Master of Business Administration), (ii) 
medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of Science), (iv) Doctor of 
Philosophy, (v) law school, and (vi) general undergraduate. To identify a politician’s alumni 
network, we relax the restriction on year of graduation. Finally, we match our data to stock 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Panel C reports the distribution of common educational backgrounds of directors and 
politicians in our sample. Degrees for undergraduate studies seem to be the most important to 
the connection of directors and politicians: 74.8% of politicians and 86.8% of directors are 
connected through their undergraduate studies, having graduated from the same 
school/university within one year. The figures are 9.6% and 3.6% for law school; 7.6% and 4.6% 
for business school; 6.8% and 4.2% for other graduate degrees. Medical school and doctoral 
degrees appear to be insignificant in connecting politicians to directors. Only 0.4% of politicians 
and 0.1% of directors are connected through medical school, while 0.8% of politicians and 0.7% 
of directors are connected through Ph.D. programs. 
Panel D reports characteristic of firms in our sample and compares them to firms in the 
Compustat universe. The sample’s firm average market capitalization is $2.13 billion, with a 
maximum of $58.64 billion and a median of $0.40 billion, which are fairly comparable to 
Compustat average firms ($2.29 billion, $467.09 billion, and $0.24 billion, respectively). Our 
average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 4.50 and age of 8.60 years, as compared to a market-
to-book ratio of 4.30 and age of 8.10 years for an average Compustat firm. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we report main empirical results of our regression discontinuity design, 
with additional results on alternative outcome variables and alternative windows. We also present 
results from alternative, non-parametric estimations, as well as the results on the impact of 
political connections across many sub-samples. 
4.1 ESTIMATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS USING A REGRESSION 
DISCONTINUITY DESIGN 
                                                 
11 We did not construct links between people previously working in the same firm, as only a few in our 
sample of politicians have previously worked in a publicly listed firm. 
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Similar to the prior literature (Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, Faccio et al. 2006), we start by 
investigating potentially strong and direct political connections. We thus focus on the 
backgrounds of candidates in close elections. Of those, incumbent congressmen sitting in 
powerful committees might wield more power than junior fellows. Connected firms to those 
powerful politicians might be more beneficial to firms.  
Empirical results are reported in Table 1. We estimate the impact of political connection 
on firm value by relating stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of connected firms 
around the election day to the win/lose status of the connected politician. Each observation 
pairs a firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second in a close election, both of whom 
graduate from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008).For every 
connected firm, we obtain daily stock returns for the 6-day event period (from day -1 to day 5), 
as well for a 255-day pre-event period (from day -315 to day -61). The event day (day 0) is the 
election day reported by the Federal Election Commission, which is always a trading day. We 
follow a conventional event study method to calculate the abnormal returns resulting from close 
elections by assuming a single-factor model with the beta estimated from the pre-event window 
(the results are not sensitive to the method of estimation of the abnormal returns). We exploit 
the RDD of close elections by limiting the sample to elections in which the vote share between 
the top two candidates is between 48.5% and 52.5% (i.e., within a 5% vote share margin), and by 
controlling for the vote shares separately for winners and losers, as suggested by Lee and 
Lemieux (2010), to obtain the effect at the exact threshold of 50%. 
We focus first on connected firms to incumbents. While the average value of connection 
to an incumbent congressman is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero, as shown in 
column (1), certain congressmen may be particularly powerful, and garner above-average benefits 
for their connected firms. We explore this possibility by considering subsamples of members of 
important committees. Column (2) shows a particularly strong positive effect of 7.43% 
(significant at the 5% level) on firm value when a congressman in the committees on 
appropriations in either house wins a close election. The appropriations committees of both 
houses control the allocation of federal funds to specific projects and are often regarded as the 
most important committees in Congress (see, e.g., the detailed discussion in Aghion et al., 2009). 
This finding shows that a politician’s membership in appropriations committees is indeed very 
valuable to connected firms. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Column (3) reports that connections to a member of one of the Senate committees who 
wins a close re-election generate a positive stock price reaction of 8.59% above that of the loser. 
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This large impact is statistically significant at the 1% level. This effect is due mostly to senior 
members of the Senate. For senators with at least five years of tenure in committees, the effect is 
8.01% and significant at the 1% level, as reported in column (4).12 Column (5) shows that the 
effect on firms connected to senators with less than five years of tenure is 6.21%, significant at 
the 1% level. This finding confirms the role of seniority in Congress as previously stressed in 
political science (e.g., Roberts, 1990; Kellerman and Shepsle, 2009). 
We also find consistent evidence of the value of connection to members of other 
committees in Congress. Columns (6) and (7) report results for committees in the Senate in 
charge of natural resources, energy, and agriculture, and economic, financial, and budgetary 
respectively. We observe a positive and significant impact of comparable magnitude. Columns 8, 
9, and 10 report the results on firms connected to incumbents in the House’s committees. We 
find that the impact on connected firms is negative, but not significant. 
Results from Table 1 show that connections to powerful incumbent politicians are 
beneficial to firms. We next investigate whether the impact is different with firms connected to 
challengers in close elections to the Congress. For this purpose, we collect information on the 
positions candidates have held up to election and classify four categories of politicians whose 
main occupation in the election year was (1) in a public office at federal level; (2) in a public 
office at state level, or below; (3) in a top state position (for example, governor); or (4) in other 
environments, including NGOs, labor unions, and independent professions, such as doctors and 
professors. Table 2 reports the benchmark estimates by the corresponding subsamples. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Column (1) shows the estimate for the subsample of challengers, including candidates in 
a race for an open seat from which the incumbent had retired. Contrary to the results on 
incumbents in Table 1, we find that, among challengers, the estimated effect of political 
connections is -3.24%, statistically significant at 1%. This result suggests that having a connected 
politician elected to Congress significantly reduces connected firms’ value. 
Columns (2) to (6) consider subsamples among challengers. Columns (2) and (3) 
distinguish between challengers coming from various positions at the federal level (for instance, 
in a senator’s office) and others. The effect is -3.5% and significantly for the latter, and 
insignificant and close to zero for the former. Columns (4) and (5) report the results on 
subsamples of challengers who had previously held top-level public offices at the state levels, and 
                                                 
12  To be more precise, we measure seniority by averaging over a congressman’s seniority across her 
committees to make the subsamples in column (4) exclusive. The choice of 5th year experience is closest to the 
sample median. 
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top state positions as governors or state legislators, respectively. We find negative estimates of -
4.36% and -3.89%, significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. On the other hand, for the 
group of candidates from non-political, business occupations, the estimated effect is -3.52%, but 
insignificant, as reported in column (6). 
Taken together, Tables2 shows a consistent result that a candidate’s election to Congress 
appears to significantly destroy value of connected firms if the elected congressman has been 
sufficiently entrenched in his home state. In contrast, the value of incumbent congressmen or of 
congressmen coming from positions in federal office is not significantly different from zero. 
This result strongly supports the possibility that politicians bring more value to firms at state 
level. Results from Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the value of connection to a congressman initially 
drops when the freshly elected congressman moves away from his previous position at state level, 
and is only restored once he becomes senior and powerful in Congress. This appears to be 
consistent with the idea that there exists a learning curve for new Congressmen.   
The value impact of political connections, as reported in Tables 1 and 3, depends on the 
position and status of the politicians. To investigate the general impact of political connections, 
we run regressions on our pooled sample. Table 3 summarizes our results. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
We find an overall negative and statistically significant value effect of connection to a 
winner in a close election. Column (1) shows our benchmark specification (vote share margin of 
5% or less, controlling separately for winners’ and losers’ vote shares) with 1,819 observations 
across 1,268 firms and 170 politicians. We find an estimate of -2.65%, significant at 1%.Column 
(2) controls additionally for quartic polynomials of winners’ and of losers’ vote shares, so as to 
single out the effect exactly at the threshold of 50% vote share (Lee and Lemieux 2010), and 
reports an even larger effect of -4.07%, significant at 1%.  
Columns (3) to (8) further show that the results are unaffected by “irrelevant covariates.” 
Indeed, when the treatment is comparable to a randomized experiment, any additional control 
variable must be independent of the treatment, thus its inclusion should not significantly alter the 
estimate of the treatment effect. Column (3) controls for characteristics of the politician (dummy 
variables for the party, gender, incumbency, Senate/House race), column (4) for connected 
directors’ characteristics (age, gender, nationality, executive/non-executive role), column (5) for 
firm characteristics (market capitalization, book value of equity, total assets, return on asset, 
capital expenditure, and leverage), producing estimates very close to the benchmark in column (1) 
and all significant at 1%. In a similar vein, unobservable characteristics of the election year or the 
industry appear also to be irrelevant covariates and thus do not alter much the main estimate, as 
16 
 
shown in columns (6) and (7). As expected, the main results are not driven by any year-specific 
or industry-specific unobservables. 
Including fixed effects for educational institutions, however, may substantially affect the 
main estimate, if a strong homophily factor pertains in the formation of the school networks that 
we consider, as discussed in the previous section. Controlling for school fixed effects, column (8) 
still produces a similar, slightly larger estimate of -2.75%, significant at 1%. It implies that 
network homophily is relatively irrelevant to our treatment, and shared school characteristics are 
not the factor behind the negative estimate of the value of connection reported in Table 1.13 
While the cross-sectional distribution of CARs includes some very large observations, 
column (9) shows that even after taking out all CARs exceeding 50% in absolute value, the result 
still remains strong at -2.30% (significant at 1%). 
The absolute size of the effect, namely -2.65% after 7 days, is 24% of the standard 
deviation of CARs in our sample. In comparison to other event studies, Faccio (2006) reports an 
average effect of 1.43% on CARs for worldwide firms experiencing an event of new political 
connection, while Goldman et al. (2009) show an effect on CARs of 8.97% in difference 
between Republican-connected and Democrat-connected firms in the event of the 2000 
presidential election. In summary, Table 3 provides evidence that firms connected to the winner 
in a close election to the U.S. Congress between 2000 and 2008 experience, on average, 
significant loss in firm value, as compared to firms connected to the runner-up. The results 
remain consistent when we control for politicians’ characteristics, firm size, election year-, 
industry- and school-fixed effects. 
4.2 EXPLANATION OF THE RESULTS 
Our finding of a value-reducing effect of political connections appears, at first glance, 
counterintuitive and different from the extant literature. It is however consistent with the 
following explanation in which the value of political connection depends on the politician’s 
position in a more complex way than previously studied: The value of connection to a 
congressman initially drops when the freshly elected congressman moves away from his previous 
position at state level, as proved in Table 2, and only increases once he becomes senior and 
powerful in Congress, as supported by Table 1. Before their elections to Congress, many 
politicians have held positions at the state level, which has probably already resulted in benefits 
for connected firms. If a politician wins his congressional election and moves to federal politics, 
connected firms’ benefits may be much harder to maintain. On the one hand, an elected 
                                                 
13 We do not include company fixed effects, as there is very little variation within companies across years, 
with the majority of companies appearing only once, thus omitted from such a fixed-effect regression. 
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politician will have less time and focus for specific state matters that relate to their connected 
firms., He may need to accumulate experience and power over time, through a learning curve 
with much electoral uncertainties, until he is senior enough to support connected firms. On the 
other hand, the strong checks and balances in federal politics in the United States may already 
block most channels by which firms connected with politicians through social networks could 
obtain significant financial benefits, as shown by Fisman et al. (2006) in the example of firms 
connected to former Vice President Dick Cheney. Consequently, from a firm’s perspective, it 
may be preferable that its socially connected politician remain at the state level, rather than get 
elected to federal office. 
This line of argument reaffirms previous findings of positive values of connections to 
key politicians, by Goldman et al. (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2010), among others, as Table 1 
consistently shows that connections to closely elected powerful incumbent congressmen 
significantly increase firm value, compared with connections to closely defeated powerful 
incumbents.. Similarly, the value-reducing effect discovered in Table 2 indicates that connections 
to state-level politicians are even more valuable than connections to junior Congress members. 
The overall results of Table 3 imply that the value-reducing effect caused by challengers 
outweighs the gain associated with incumbents in our sample. 
There is further evidence that these effects are not coincidental. We use a market model 
to predict actual trading volume based on a prior window from day -315 to day -61 before each 
election event to obtain, and then subtract predicted volume from actual volume to obtain 
abnormal daily trading volume (see Campbell and Wasley, 1996, for more details.) The results 
show that stocks in our sample are significantly more widely traded around the event, with 
5.21% cumulative abnormal volume during the window (-5,-1), and 2.22% cumulative abnormal 
volume during the window (-1,+5) (both statistics are significant at 1%.) It implies that at least a 
part of the market does pay particular attention to those stocks during the relevant elections. 
It is important to note that the types of political connections we study do not need to be 
salient market-wide, in order for the relevant prices to fully react to news from the elections. 
Instead, a few traders or investors with privileged information on political connections can be 
sufficient to move market prices of connected stocks. 
Before further hypotheses based on our explanation are developed and tested in section 
5, subsections 4.3 to 4.6 further explore the main regressions and check the results’ robustness. 
The uninterested reader may skip these subsections to jump directly to section 5. 
4.3 EFFECTS BY GROUPS 
The previous sub-section shows the robust, consistent, and strong impact of firms’ 
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political connections on firm value. We now explore whether that impact is present in different 
sub-groups of companies. Table 4 summarizes our results. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Our identification strategy is based on close Senate and House elections from 2000 to 
2008. As the Senate and the House serve different missions, one might expect that the value of a 
firm’s connection to a member of the House or to a member of the Senate might be different. 
We thus divide our samples into two subsamples of firms depending on whether the close 
election is for the Senate or the House, rerun the benchmark regression in column (2) of Table 1, 
and report the respective results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. For both subsamples, the 
results are consistent with our pooled regression results from Table 1, and significant at 1% and 
10% respectively: for both the Senate and the House, firms connected to the winner experience 
significant loss in firm value. In addition, firms connected to the winner in a close Senate 
election appear to experience a greater loss of firm value than do firms connected to the winner 
in a close House election (-4.24% against -2.14%). 
We also explore whether a candidate belongs to the Chamber majority or Chamber 
minority affect our results, by partitioning the sample accordingly. Regression results from 
columns (3) and (4) show a loss of value effect in both subsamples. In columns (5) and (6), we 
further explore the sample of Democrats and of Republicans. In both cases, the effect is 
statistically significant at 5%, with a slightly larger size for Republicans than for Democrats (-
2.86% versus -2.43%). This result echoes Snowberg et al.’s (2007) finding that, when it comes to 
holding majority in Congress, partisan differences matter little to the market.  
Our measure of social networks is based on the network between directors and 
politicians. As independent directors and executive directors are supposed to assume different 
tasks, we repeat our tests in subsamples of connections through independent directors and 
executive directors. We find, as reported in columns (7) and (8), that firms connected to a 
politician through one of its independent directors experience a significant loss of value (-
2.76%), while the impact is not significant in firms connected to a politician through an inside 
(executive) director. In the latter sample, the estimate at -1.84% is still negative and sizeable, and 
the lack of significance could be attributed to the small sample size. 
The impact of political connection on firm value may also depend on the nature of the 
connection. We investigate this direction by checking the estimates across different school 
networks. We sort the educational institutions by the number of observations in the sample, as it 
is important to look at the number of prominent graduates that rise to the top in business and 
politics, and not just at any graduate from the same year. Intuitively, when a network is better 
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represented in the sample, its links are arguably stronger in Granovetter’s (1974) sense, in that 
each pair shares more common connections. Such a network has a higher measure of network 
closure, according to Karlan et al. (2009), and is more conducive to agreements that require 
commitments between pairs in the network. In contrast, Karlan et al. (2009) show that a low 
closure network is provides better incentives for information sharing. 
Through this exercise, Harvard and Yale come out as the two most represented 
universities (if we had looked at the number of graduates each year, large state universities would 
have dominated). Columns (9) and (10) report the estimate of -3.92% and -5.45% for the 
subsamples of connections based on Harvard and Yale networks, and Harvard networks, 
respectively. Columns (11) and (12) show the results for the subsamples of universities that are 
below and above the median number of observations, respectively at -2.45% and -2.55%, 
significant at the 5% level. The effect is markedly stronger for Harvard and Yale as compared 
with the average, yet little difference exists between the subsamples above and below median. 
This result is consistent with an explanation that network strength and network closure matter 
only at the very top schools, and that political connections matter mostly as commitment devices 
for deals, rather than for information sharing purposes. However, we cannot rule out some 
alternative explanations, such as that the media pay more attention to the educational 
background of graduates from Harvard and Yale, or that there are other unobserved elements 
very specific to these universities that help strengthen this effect. 
In summary, Table 4 shows that our finding—that connections to a politician in a close 
election incur a significant loss in firm value—is consistent and robust to the type of election 
(Senate vs. House), as well as across several subsamples and subgroups. 
4.4 ALUMNI NETWORK 
We have so far identified the social connections between a board director of a firm and a 
politician by the criterion that the politician and the director graduate within one year from the 
same university, campus, college, or professional school. In this subsection, we study the impact 
of a politician’s alumni network by relaxing the restriction on year of graduation. Columns (1) to 
(9) in Table 5 replicate the same tests from Table 3 and report the results. Column (10) runs a 
benchmark non-parametric test. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
The benchmark regression in column (2) shows that an additional connection to an 
elected politician in alumni networks reduces a firm’s CARs by 0.58%. This estimate, statistically 
significant at 5%,is much smaller than the corresponding estimate of -2.65% for classmate 
networks, as reported in column (1) of Table 3.The non-parametric test reported in column (10) 
20 
 
produces a larger coefficient of -1.38%, statistically significant at 1%. Across the columns of 
Table 5, the negative and significant estimates of the value of alumni-network political 
connection on the CARs remain consistent, but with coefficient sizes much smaller than in Table 
3(In columns (1) and (6), the results are no longer significant at 10%, though they are   negative.) 
The smaller estimates in Table 5, as compared with Table 3, can be explained in two 
different ways. First, one should expect the links between alumni who are not classmates to be 
less important than the links between classmates. Because our result is an average effect over all 
pairs of connected individuals, the estimate should be smaller in size in alumni networks than in 
classmate networks. Second, as our connection variable is only a proxy for friendships or 
acquaintances in reality, the presence of measurement errors will likely imply an attenuation bias 
on our estimates. As more measurement error is probable in the alumni networks than in 
classmate networks, the attenuation bias will be larger for the alumni networks, leading to smaller 
estimates, as found in Table 5. 
Overall, results from Table 5 show that our main results remain consistent when we relax 
our measure of social networks to alumni networks. In our context, we still find a social network 
effect even in a sample constructed with a less stringent definition of social network. 
4.5 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we explore alternative specifications with different event windows and 
calculations of the CARs. Table 6summarizes this exercise. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
In Panel A, we check the consistency of our results by varying the event windows used in 
Table 3. Column (1) of Panel A reports the results of regressions using CARs from a pre-event 
window from day -7 to day -1. The coefficient of interest is very small and not statistically 
significant. This shows that the treatment has not been predicted by the market prior to the 
event, as expected from the close elections design. 
While column (3) reports the benchmark result for the window from day -1 to day 5, as 
in column (1) of Table 3, columns (2), (4), and (5) use different starting days for the event 
window, namely beginning on day -1,on the event day (day 0), and on day +1, and ending on day 
+1 and day +5. We find that consistently negative and significant coefficient. Interestingly, we 
find negative and significant coefficients on the Win/Lose dummy, of about 70% the size of the 
benchmark estimate in column (5) for the (+1, +5) window. This result implies that market 
reaction after one day accounts to only about 30% of the full effect, and substantial further 
reaction occurs even after day 1 up to day 5. We can consequently create a portfolio on day +1 
after the event, knowing all the results of elections, shorting on firms connected to closely 
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elected politicians and longing on those connected to closely defeated ones, with equal weights 
on firm connections (i.e., a firm’s stock is counted twice if it is connected to two different 
politicians). From day 1 to day 5, this portfolio yields a risk-free return of 1.85%. 
Beyond our benchmark window, such as from day 6 to day 20 after the election day, as 
reported in column (6), we find an insignificant estimate of the value of connection. While this 
finding is consistent with the market having fully priced in the news after day 5, it could also be 
due to the presence of much additional noise, which hinders statistical significance. 
In all regressions throughout the paper, we calculate the heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard errors clustered at the level of politician-election year level to avoid the potential 
downward bias of standard error estimates when the error terms can be autocorrelated among 
observations sharing the same politician and election year (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004). The qualitative results are strongly robust to other levels of clustering, including by 
director, firm, year, and politician’s state, and are available upon request. 
Given the high cross-sectional variance of CARs, one may worry that our results are 
affected by stocks with aberrantly high volatility. Simply censoring aberrant values, as shown in 
column (9) of Table 3, may not entirely solve the issue, because of a potential censoring bias. A 
different approach consists of normalizing each stock’s CAR by its standard error derived from 
the market model within the event window. Panel B of Table 6 repeats Table 3’s regressions with 
this new outcome variable, with the same qualitative results as in Panel A. Being connected to an 
elected politician has a statistically significant impact of about negative 32.2% on a firm’s 
standardized CAR, or about one third of a standard deviation of the firm’s CARs during the 
event window. 
In other tests of robustness reported in Appendix Table A1, we calculate the CARs using 
different methods, including the cumulative daily stock (raw) returns in columns (1) and (2), 
Fama-French’s three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) in columns (3) and (4), and the four-
factor model (Carhart 1997) in column (5) and (6). We find estimates mostly similar to those 
reported in Table 3, either including or excluding school fixed effects.  
Appendix Table A1 also reports results for alternative specifications of a unit of 
observation. In the benchmark model, we choose an observation as a classmate connection 
between a politician and a director for a given election year, where the treatment variable is 
binary. That empirical design implies the interpretation of the estimate as the WATE of an 
additional connection to a politician in office. In alternative specifications, we can choose a unit 
of observation as a director or a firm (each for a given election day), where the treatment variable 
is the count of connections to elected politicians. The difference is in the weights: while each 
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connection has the same weight in the benchmark setup, in alternative specifications, the same-
weight unit could be director, or firm, or politician. Columns (7) to (9) of Appendix Table A1 
show very similar results. Finally, column (10) reruns the benchmark regression in Table 3 with 
standard errors subject to two-way clustering of both Politician-Year and Company-Year 
(Cameron et al., 2011), yielding the same qualitative results. 
We check the near-randomness of winning or losing a close election as highlighted by 
Lee (2008) and report supporting results in Appendix Table A2. Each column serves to show 
that a dependent variable's distribution is continuous at the cutoff point of 50% vote share. 
These dependent variables are those used as control variable in Tables (1) to (10). Panel A shows 
results for politician's gender, age, chamber, logarithm of campaign contribution, logarithm of 
number of contributors, and incumbency. Panel B considers challenger's party and different 
backgrounds, director's age, gender and executive/non-executive role, and social network size. 
Panel C displays results with different firm characteristics. Panel D reports regressions with 
industry's financial dependence, state's institution quality and corruption measured in different 
ways. Across regressions we do not find any significant relationship between different dependent 
variables and our main independent variable (Win/Lose dummy). This confirms the near-
randomness of the win/lose treatment induced by close elections for US Senate and Congress 
between 2000 and 2008. 
We also investigate the heterogeneous effects of political connections from quantile 
regressions for challengers from state politics, and report supporting results in Appendix Table 
A3.Column (1) shows results from median regression (50% quantile). Columns (2) to (5) report 
the estimation using quantile regressions at the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles. The estimate’s 
negativity is shown to come mostly from the lower quintiles, i.e. among firms with negative 
CARs. 
In further robustness checks, Table 7 reports the result of the nonparametric 
specification as detailed in Section 2. Column (1) shows a 1%-statistically significant estimated 
effect of negative 3.40%, which is even stronger than in Table 3. Columns (2) to (5) indicate that 
the effect is robust in size and statistically significant across a wide range of bandwidths. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Our RDD has so far exclusively focused on the vote share threshold of 50%. In columns 
(6) to (9), we further test the robustness of our result by applying the same method to “placebo” 
thresholds of vote share, instead of the actual cut-off at 50%. For example, in the sample used 
for column (6), a politician is marked as elected if his vote share is 48% or above, and marked as 
defeated otherwise. We then apply the nonparametric regression around the placebo cutoff of 
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48% and report the corresponding estimate. Because such a placebo threshold does not separate 
winners from losers in reality, we do not expect to find results similar to column (1). Columns 
(6) to (9) confirm our prediction: for the placebo thresholds of 48%, 49%, 51% and 52%, the 
estimate is always positive and not statistically significant at 10%. 
Figures 1.A and 1.B visualize the numerical results presented in Table 7 by plotting the 
outcome variable, namely firms’ CARs over the window (-1,+5), against vote shares. Each graph 
represents the fitted local polynomial of degree 3 for vote shares, separately for elected or 
defeated politicians. Figure 1.A also includes bins of actual observations, represented as dots, 
while they are removed in figure 1.B to clarify the gap at the discontinuity point of 50% vote 
share. At this point, we see a sizeable gap, whereas the gradient of the graph is relatively small 
elsewhere, as already tested with placebo thresholds in Table 3. Furthermore, there is visual 
evidence of a “Z” shape of CAR with respect to vote share: as vote share increases around 50%, 
CAR first increases, then drops sharply at the threshold of 50%, and then increases again. This Z 
shape is predicted in a pricing model, such as Cuñat et al.’s (2009), where the market internalizes 
available information before election and partially anticipates the discontinuity effect at 50%, to 
an extent proportionate to the difference between prior probabilities of winning or losing and 
the threshold of 50%. For example, for an election resulting in vote shares of 52% versus 48%, it 
is likely that the market’s prior probability of the first candidate’s winning is larger than 50%, 
hence a part of the effect at 50% has already been incorporated in market prices even before the 
election. Therefore, we do not see a large difference between the CARs at 48% and at 52% on 
the graphs in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figures 1.A and 1.B Here] 
However, the robustness of the Z shape depends on the relatively strong hypothesis that 
no confounding factors can possibly bias the non-parametric cross-section estimation in the 
whole range of vote shares between 48.5% and 52.5%. This hypothesis is not necessary for the 
consistency of RDD, which depends only on the lack of full manipulation at exactly the 
threshold of 50%. In other words, if one is skeptical that elections of 4-5% margin cannot be 
considered close, and the identity of the winner or loser therein may be endogenous, then such 
endogeneity can significantly affect the Z-shape, but it does not invalidate the RDD result 
obtained from the 50% threshold. 
In summary, Tables 6 and 7, and Appendices Tables A1, A2, and A3 show that our 
results are robust to different methodological specifications. Furthermore, they are found only in 
specifications where the treatment matters, and not in tests with irrelevant event windows or 
irrelevant vote share thresholds. Consequently, political connection must be the causal factor 
24 
 
behind these results. 
5. TESTS OF FURTHER PREDICTIONS 
The previous sections have shown an average overall negative impact of political 
connections on firm value. In this section, we investigate potential channels of this effect. Based 
on prior literature, we advance the three following hypotheses:     
Prediction 1: In states with stronger institutional checks and balances, firms receive 
fewer benefits from their state-level political connections through social networks. 
Prediction 2: Firm characteristics may determine the value of political connections. 
Prediction 3: Firm activities in the connected politician’s state should decline following 
the politician’s successful election, as compared with an unsuccessful one. We will test these 
predictions on sub-samples based on institution quality measures, firm characteristics, and firm 
activities. We run the benchmark regression in each subsample and compare the estimates. The 
following subsections will detail the corresponding results. 
5.1 STATE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
Moving away from politicians’ backgrounds, Prediction 1 concerns a different dimension 
of our explanation: under better checks and balances at the state level, the estimated effect of 
connection should be weaker. Table 8 shows various ample supports of this prediction.14 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Columns (1) and (2) distinguish between politicians’ states having more or less than 
median regulations. The index of regulation by state is measured for 1999 in Clemson 
University’s Report on Economic Freedom, http://freedom.clemson.edu. This report combines 
information on labor and environmental regulations and regulations in specific industries such as 
insurance. As expected, we find a strongly negative and significant effect in states with more 
regulations, where the potential is greater for politicians to grant benefits to connected firms on a 
discretionary basis. 
Instead of regulations, columns (3) to (8) attempt to divide states by actual level of 
corruption. The most commonly used measure of state-level corruption comes from Glaeser and 
Saks (2006), who extract actual conviction data from the Department of Justice’s “Report to 
Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section” to form a measure of 
                                                 
14These results are also confirmed by regressions, including an interaction between our main explanatory 
variable, Win/Lose, and a dummy variable for good/bad institutions as in Table 8. Because these regressions 
implicitly impose the same coefficients for the controls of vote share for each subsample, they are less preferred 
than our reported results, and are only available upon request. 
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the ratio of convicted corruption cases by population size, averaged from 1976 to 2002 to 
remove periodical noises. Using that measure, columns (3) and (4) show a more sizable and 
significant effect in more corrupt states. 
Because one may expect that actual conviction cases only amount to a small fraction of 
real corrupt deals, the measure of actual conviction may not truly depict the extent of corruption 
in a state. We overcome this concern by using Saiz and Simonsohn’s (2008) approach of 
“downloading wisdom from online crowds.” More specifically, columns (5) and (6) use a 
measure of search hits on Exalead.com for the term “corruption” near the name of the main city 
in each state, normalized by the number of search hits for the name of that main city, to divide 
the sample of all states into those with higher or lower than median corruption, as reported in 
the news. While Exalead.com conducts web-based searches, columns (7) and (8) use the dataset 
of all newspapers gathered in Newslibrary.com to search for the word “corruption” close to the 
state name, with the number of search hits normalized by the search hits for the state name 
alone. We can thus cover cases of corruption as reported both on the internet and in newspapers. 
Both measures yield satisfying results that support our intuition, as the effect is stronger and 
statistically significant in more corrupt states, while it is indistinguishable from zero in less 
corrupt states. 
As these measures of institutional qualities are calculated before this paper’s period of 
study, we partly avoid the problem of direct reverse causation. However, the use of measures of 
corruption or regulations may expose us to the problem of endogenous selection, where certain 
unobserved characteristics may affect both the selection into good or bad institutional designs, 
and later affect the political connection that we estimate. While we still have clearly identified the 
WATE of political connections, we cannot ascertain that its variation across states truly comes 
from the differences in institutional quality. This endogeneity problem is a perennial problem in 
all studies of the economics of institutions, where the exogeneity and excludability of 
instrumental variables are keys to the answer. 
In columns (9) and (10) we attempt to check this problem by using GCISC, a measure of 
population concentration around the state capital city. As developed by Campante and Do 
(2010), this measure is highly predictive of several measures of qualities of political governance 
both across countries and across American states (higher concentration implies better institution 
quality because of the political pressure of the population). This measure is also highly persistent 
over time and is arguably much less directly affected by institution qualities than by historical 
events, such as the somewhat arbitrary choice of state capitals. As expected, our estimated effect 
is strongly significant among states of lower-than-median population concentration, as shown in 
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column (9), while in column (10), the effect is practically indistinct from zero. 
In sum, Table 8 provides evidence that the estimated effect of political connection is all 
the more important in states that are more corrupt, have more regulations, and worse institutions, 
entirely in accordance with our explanation of the differential value of political connections 
between state-level politics and federal politics. 
5.2 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
We now study firm characteristics as potential determinants of the relationship between 
political connections and firm value, and detail the results in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Columns (1) and (2) report regression results on two subsamples of firms whose market 
capitalization is respectively above or below the median. The difference between those results 
indicates that smaller politically connected firms experience greater loss of value when the 
connected politician wins an election to Congress (loss of 6.56% for smaller firms, significant at 
1%, as compared with no effect among larger firms). Put differently, political connections are 
more important for small firms. Larger firms may be connected to many politicians, and the 
financial benefit of connection to one more politician may only represent a small fraction of the 
firm’s value; hence, for larger firms, we expect a smaller effect. 
One may conjecture that firms benefit from political connections thanks to easier access 
to finance, as shown by Khwaja and Mian (2005). Accordingly, we investigate whether the value 
of political connection is associated with the firm’s dependence on external finance. We 
construct Rajan and Zingales’s (1998)measure of dependence on external finance by 3-digit SIC 
industries as the industry average of (CapEx – Cash flow from Operations)/CapEx, then divide 
our sample into industries with above and below median scores. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 
report our standard regression results on these two sub-samples. For industries relying more on 
external finance, the coefficient on the Win/Lose dummy is -2.99% and significant at 5%; in 
contrast, for the subsample of industries with less dependence on external financial sources, the 
estimated effect is insignificant at conventional levels. Firms that are financially independent 
seem not to be affected after election results. 
The estimated effect appears to be particularly strong when determinants are interacted. 
Column (5) shows that small firms that rely heavily on external finance incur a very high loss of 
value: the average loss is 5.64% (significant at 1%) in firm value as a result of a connection to a 
politician in federal office. Column (6) considers the subsample of states with higher than 
median corruption, using the Newslibrary.com measure as detailed in the previous subsection, 
for which the distance between the firm’s headquarters and the politician’s state is in the smallest 
27 
 
quartile (less than 650km). Such distance is used as a proxy for the presence and interests of the 
firm in the politician’s state, as we expect the effect to be stronger for firms that do more 
business in the politician’s state. The estimated effect in column (6) of Table 9 is much stronger 
than in column (7) of Table 8, and much stronger than for the sample with the limitation by 
distance alone.15 In column (7) of Table 9, the sample is limited to states with higher than median 
corruption, and to industries with higher than median reliance on external finance. As expected, 
the effect is strongly significant, and is much larger than both column (3) and column (7) of 
Table 8. 
5.3 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRMS ACTIVITIES IN CORRESPONDING STATES 
The estimation results shown in Table 9 indirectly corroborate the storyline that firms get 
benefit from politicians before their election to federal office. A more direct test of Prediction 3 
can be based on the change in firm activities after the event of the election. Unfortunately, 
systematic data on firm activities by state and year, measured either by sales or investment, are 
unavailable. 
We surmount this difficulty by providing a new measure of firm activities by state and 
year. Again, we follow Saiz and Simonsohn’s (2008) idea of “downloading wisdom” by searching 
each company’s name through local newspapers in the connected politician’s state within each 
year, using Newslibrary.com; we then normalize the number of search hits by the search hits for 
the neutral keyword “September” across the same set of newspapers. The resulting hit rate is 
used as a proxy of a firm’s activities within a state in a certain year. We further remove any firm-
state fixed effect by looking at only the change in the hit rate after each year, then use this 
measure of changes of firm activities across various windows and subsamples as the dependent 
variable in our benchmark regressions, and report the results in Table 10.16 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Columns (1) to (3) focus on the subsample of challengers with top state experience that 
was used in Table 2. Column (1), in particular, shows that being connected to an elected 
congressman clearly reduces a firm’s activities in the corresponding state from the election year 
(where elections are held in November) to the following year, with a coefficient of -0.96 
percentage points of hit rates. Column (2) presents a placebo test in the period before the event, 
                                                 
15 Results on the division relating to the distance between a firm’s headquarters and a politician’s state are 
available upon request. 
16 Changes in our measure of firm activities, calculated for the whole sample of all U.S. local newspapers, 
are highly correlated with changes in firm sales, investments, R&D, employment, and cash flows. These results, 
available upon request, suggest that our measure is a good proxy for firm activities at state level. 
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between election year -1 and the election year. The resulting small estimate—insignificantly 
different from zero—indicates that the treated and control samples are very similar before the 
event, thus confirming the RDD. We notice from column (3) that any adjustment following the 
event has been accomplished by 1 year after the election, as the estimated effect is close to zero 
for the window from year 1 to year2. Column (4) provides the comparable result (although the 
magnitude of the effect is slightly larger) for the subsample of challengers with top state 
experience.   
Focusing on the main event window from the election year to the year after, columns (4) 
and (6) of Table 10 follow Table 2 in treating different subsamples of politicians, namely 
candidates from federal offices, and from other backgrounds, respectively). Reassuringly, we do 
not see any significant results in those subsamples, confirming the intuition that the effect on 
firm activities passes uniquely through the movement of politicians from state to federal offices. 
The examination of firm characteristics and activities by state, as shown in Tables 9 and 
10, thereby provides further evidence that certain firms benefit from political connections at 
state level more than others, and that such firms are more likely to move out of the state when 
the favor is over.Taken together, the verifications of Predictions 1, 2, and 3 across Tables 8 to 10 
provide a wide array of support to the explanation that politicians bring more benefits to (certain 
kinds of) connected firms before, than they do after, electionsto federal office. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper investigates corporate benefits of political connections from the social 
network of directors and politicians. We use the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to 
identify the connection to a politician elected to the U.S. Congress in a closely contested race. 
The estimate of the Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE) during the period 2000 to 
2008 shows a negative, both economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return 
of 2.65% surrounding the election date. The results are robust to various specifications, 
parametric and nonparametric, throughout different measures of outcome variables, with 
different definitions of social network, and across many subsamples. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we propose an internally valid 
identification strategy using the RDD of close elections that effectively deals with the 
endogenous nature of connected politicians. Our results are also externally valid, as the estimated 
WATE is averaged over the sample of all politicians susceptible to experience a close election. 
The external validity is further strengthened as firms in our sample are comparable to 
Compustat’s universe. 
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Second, we find that the value of connection to U.S. congressmen varies. Strong 
connections, i.e. connections to powerful incumbent members of Senate or House committees, 
are associated with positive stock price reaction. We also find an average negative effect of 
connection, which is consistent with an explanation that firms benefit more from political 
connections when the connected politician remains in state politics than when (s)he moves to 
the federal level. We empirically test several resulting predictions and find a wide range of 
evidence supporting our hypothesis. 
We remain cautious in generalizing the empirical results for several reasons. First, while 
our estimate is a weighted average treatment effect (WATE) across all politicians, we 
acknowledge that some politicians may naturally have higher chances of competing in a close 
election, and correspond to larger weights in the WATE. Our interpretation is therefore more 
informative on those politicians than some others who by nature always win (or lose) by large 
margins. Second, our analysis is limited to elections from 2000 to 2008, given excessive data 
collection costs, and focuses uniquely on the social network of classmates. Extrapolations before 
and after this period, or towards other types of political connections, require careful 
consideration. Third, we measure market valuations from investors’ trading behaviors according 
to their beliefs and expectations; and investors may be surprised by actual behaviors of firms and 
politicians after the elections. We also stop short of inferring potential effects on the general 
welfare. These topics are natural targets for future research in this line of work.Overall, our study 
identifies the value of political connections through social networks in the United States and 
uncovers its variation across different states and between state and federal political environments. 
This remarkable gap in the value of connections calls for more attention and research on the 
theory and empirics of political connections and state-level institutional design. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
From Lee and Lemieux (2010), the Average Treatment Effect we estimate is defined and 
expressed as: 
ߚோ஽஽ ؝ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘՝ହ଴%
ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܹ݅݊ሻ െ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘՛ହ଴%
ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ
ൌ ܧሺܥܣܴ௜ሺܹ݅݊ሻ െ ܥܣܴ௜ሺܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ 50%ሻ. 
This estimate is well identified under the assumption that the density of VoteShare, 
conditional on all characteristics of an observation, is continuous. Such assumption is guaranteed 
when the incidence of winning cannot be perfectly manipulated by candidates. Moreover, if we 
let the effect be heterogeneous across observations, i.e., ߚሺ ௜ܹሻ  with ௜ܹ  representing all 
observable and unobservable characteristics of each observation i, then the estimate can be 
rewritten as follows: 
ߚோ஽஽ ൌ නߚሺܹሻ
݂ሺ50%|ܹሻ
݂ሺ50%ሻ
݀ܩሺܹሻ, 
where ܩሺܹሻ is the cumulative distribution of W, ݂ሺݔሻis the density of VoteShare, and the 
weight ௙ሺହ଴%|ௐሻ
௙ሺହ଴%ሻ
 represents the ex-ante likelihood of an observation with characteristics W to 
produce a close election. ߚோ஽஽ is thus a Weighted Average Treatment Effect across all possible 
observations. 
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Table D1 Summary Statistics 
 
This  table  reports descriptive statistics of our sample. Panels A and B  report vote margin distribution and 
summary  statistics of elections and politicians per year,  respectively. Federal election  results are  collected 
from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website. For each election, we  identify the candidate  finishing 
first  and  second  and  calculate  the  margin  of  votes  between  the  top  two  candidates.  A  close  election  is 
specified  by  a margin  of  votes  of  less  than  5%.  Panel C  reports  the  distribution  of  common  educational 
backgrounds of directors and politicians in our sample. We define a political connection as a link between a 
firm’s director  and  an  election  candidate who  graduate  from  the  same university  program within  a  year. 
Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), we group the degrees  into six categories: (i) business school 
(Master of Business Administration), (ii) medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of 
Science),  (iv)  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  (v)  law  school,  and  (vi)  general  undergraduate.  Panel  D  reports 
characteristic of firms in our sample and compares them to firms in the Compustat universe.   
 
A. Close Elections at 5%‐Vote Margin 
  Senate    House of Reps.    Total 
Election Year  Number of Close Election 
Average 
Margin   
Number of 
Close Election 
Average 
Margin   
Number of 
Close Election 
Average 
Margin 
                 
2000  8  2.76%    18  2.28%    26  2.43% 
2002  4  2.03%    19  2.94%    23  2.79% 
2004  5  3.01%    10  2.92%    15  2.95% 
2006  3  1.83%    33  2.27%    36  2.23% 
2008  3  1.63%    25  2.74%    28  2.62% 
Sample  23  2.42%    105  2.57%    128  2.54% 
 
 
B. Time Series (Biannual Observations, 2000‐2008) 
   Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Q1  Q3  Stdev 
Elections per year  26  26  15  36  23  28  8 
  % of elections  5.45  5.51  3.21  7.68  4.93  5.94  1.62 
  % of reps  4.82  4.39  2.31  7.57  4.11  5.71  1.96 
  % of senators  13.64  11.76  9.09  23.53  9.09  14.71  6 
             
Politicians per year  89  84  61  112  82  108  21 
  % of elections  6.24  6.14  4.47  7.78  5.95  6.85  1.22 
  % of reps  4.87  4.99  2.18  7.21  4.39  5.60  1.84 
  % of senators  17.11  14.81  11.19  27.12  11.98  20.47  6.67 
             
Firms per year  362  372  200  588  260  392  149 
  % of stocks  4.97  4.63  2.89  8.39  3.57  5.40  2.14 
  % of total market value  13.09  11.79  8.12  20.99  10.97  13.60  4.84 
             
Academic institutions per year  49  50  32  71  40  54  15 
             
 
 
C. Distribution of Degree and Graduation Years 
                    
Degree  Politicians  Directors  Graduation Year  Politicians  Directors 
Business School  7.6% 4.6% <1950  3.6% 17.6% 
Medical School  0.4% 0.1% 1950‐59  4.8% 4.1% 
Graduate  6.8% 4.2% 1960‐69  21.2% 32.6% 
PhD  0.8% 0.7% 1970‐79  42.8% 32.6% 
Law School  9.6% 3.6% 1980‐89  20.0% 11.4% 
Undergraduate  74.8% 86.8% >=1990  7.6% 1.7% 
       
 
 
D. Firm Characteristics 
                                   
Sample     Compustat Universe 
   Min  Mean  Median  Max  Std Dev.     Min  Mean  Median  Max  Std Dev. 
Market Cap (in $million)  2.3  2131.5  395.4  58638.2  5389.2  0.0  2288.7  232.8  467092.9  11085.5 
Common Equity (in $million)  1.0  855.5  164.0  52817.0  2898.9  0.0  985.8  118.0  224234.3  5449.4 
Market to Book Ratio  0.1  4.5  2.3  246.1  11.7  0.0  4.3  1.9  7071.4  59.0 
Capital Expenditure (in 
$million)  0.0  88.1  9.6  3023.0  275.7  0.0  144.6  6.7  31574.4  896.2 
Age  0.1  8.6  8.4  40.6  5.7  0.0  8.1  7.2  59.7  6.2 
Leverage  0.0  0.3  0.2  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.2  1.0  0.3 
Tobin's Q  0.3  2.4  1.6  29.5  2.4  0.1  2.1  1.4  111.5  2.7 
Payout  0.0  80.8  1.2  2601.0  238.4  0  81.1  0.2  16019.0  505.5 
Tangibility  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.9  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.0  0.2 
ROA  ‐2.7  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.3  ‐43.7  ‐0.1  0.0  3.3  0.6 
RND  0.0  0.1  0.1  2.5  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  7.5  0.2 
Cash Reserve Ratio  0.0  0.3  0.2  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.0  0.3 
                                   
Notes: 
(1) Corresponding Compustat universe includes all firms within Compustat in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
(2) Book value of equity<0, Capex<0, Share outstanding<0, Price at fiscal year end <0, Firm Age <0 are removed. 
 
 
Table 1: Connections to Incumbent Politicians 
                 
This  table  reports RDD  regressions of  the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among politically connected  firms around close elections  for US Senate and 
Congress between 2000 and 2008 for the subsample of incumbents. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to an incumbent Congressman finishing first 
or second in a close election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns 
are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. 
Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of 
votes between  the  top  two candidates being  less  than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers)  refer  to  the vote shares of winners and vote 
shares of losers, respectively. Column (1) groups all incumbent candidates. Column (2) considers only members of the Appropriations Committee in both 
chambers. Columns (3) and (8) group all  incumbent senators and  incumbent representatives, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) use  the subsamples of 
senators with more or less than 5 years of seniority. Column (6) considers senate committees related to agriculture and natural resources (see appendix for 
detailed classification). Column  (7) considers senate committees  related  to  the economy, budget and public  finance  issues. Column  (9) and  (10) show 
results for representatives with more or less than 3 years of seniority. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each 
election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                
Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Subsample  All Incumbents 
In Both Houses 
Senate 
Committees 
In Senate 
House 
Committees 
In House of Representative 
Appropriations 
Comm.  Seniority>=5  Seniority<5 
Resources & 
Agriculture 
Economy, 
Budget & 
Finance 
Seniority>=3  Seniority<3 
                             
Win/Lose  ‐0.0129  0.0743  0.0859  0.0801  0.0621  0.0760  0.0856  ‐0.0115  ‐0.0262  ‐0.00635 
  [0.0145]  [0.0294]**  [0.0170]***  [0.0165]***  [0.00668]***  [0.00584]***  [0.0165]***  [0.0184]  [0.0226]  [0.0204] 
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R‐squared  0.006  0.017  0.016  0.011  0.046  0.031  0.017  0.003  0.005  0.001 
Obs  586  58  127  111  102  71  119  459  299  214 
                                
 
Table 2: Connections to Challengers 
This table reports RDD regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among politically connected firms 
around  close  elections  for  US  Senate  and  Congress  between  2000  and  2008  for  the  subsample  of 
challengers. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to a challenging candidate finishing first or second in a 
close election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the same university program within a year  (Cohen et al. 
2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). 
The market model  is  estimated using daily data  over  a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period. Win/Lose  is  a dummy 
variable equal  to one  if and only  if a politician  finishes  first or  second  in an election. A close election  is 
specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Column 
(1) considers the sample of all challengers. Columns (2) and (3) divide the sample of challengers into those 
with  recent  federal  positions  and  the  rest.  Column  (4)  groups  all  challengers  with  recent  state  level 
positions,  and  column  (5)  limits  them  to  those  with  past  positions  in  state's  legislative  bodies  or  as 
governors.  Column  (6)  considers  challengers  from  all  other  backgrounds.  Standard  errors  in  square 
brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by  politicians  in  each  election.  *,  **  and  ***  denote  statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                    
Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Subsample  All Challengers 
Among Challengers 
From Federal 
Offices 
Non‐
Federal 
From State 
Politics 
Top State 
Experience  From Others 
                    
Win/Loss  ‐0.0324  ‐0.00832  ‐0.0350  ‐0.0436  ‐0.0389  ‐0.0352 
  [0.0107]***  [0.0287]  [0.0104]***  [0.0142]***  [0.0180]**  [0.0255] 
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R‐squared  0.009  0.007  0.011  0.013  0.016  0.013 
Obs  1,221  199  1,022  539  341  483 
                    
Table 3: Connections to All Politicians 
This  table  reports pooled RDD  regressions of  the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among  the politically  connected  firms around  close elections  for US 
Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to a candidate (incumbent or challenger) finishing first or second in 
a close election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a 
dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between 
the top two candidates, with an x% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than x% vote margin. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share 
(Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Column (1) reports the benchmark estimation, while column (2) reports 
the  results  using  4th‐order  polynomials  of  vote  shares  (separately  for  winners  and  losers)  as  controls.  Column  (3)  controls  for  dummy  variables 
representing party, gender, incumbency, senate/house race, and the logarithm of total campaign contribution, and of the number of contributors for each 
connected  politician. Column  (4)  controls  for  dummy  variables  representing  age,  gender,  nationality,  executive/non‐executive  role  of  the  connected 
director. Column (5) controls for firm's market value, book value of equity, total assets, return on asset, capital expenditure and leverage. Columns (6), (7) 
and (8) control respectively for fixed effects of years, SIC 2‐digit industries, and educational institutions. Column (9) excludes observations with CAR of 
50% or higher. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                             
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Subsample  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  No Outliers 
                             
Win/Lose  ‐0.0265  ‐0.0407  ‐0.0307  ‐0.0288  ‐0.0292  ‐0.0257  ‐0.0270  ‐0.0275  ‐0.0230 
  [0.00853]***  [0.0137]***  [0.0112]***  [0.00928]***  [0.00973]***  [0.00835]***  [0.00926]***  [0.0110]**  [0.00774]*** 
                   
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and Vote 
Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                   
Controls    4th Poly 
Politician 
Controls 
Director 
Controls  Firm Controls  Year FE  Industry FE 
University 
FE   
                   
R‐squared  0.006  0.010  0.021  0.038  0.019  0.013  0.040  0.096  0.005 
Obs  1,819  1,819  1,795  1,722  1,623  1,819  1,804  1,819  1,788 
                             
Table 4: Value of Political Connections by Groups               
                     
This table reports RDD regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections for US Senate and 
Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a  firm’s director to a candidate  finishing  first or second  in a close election, who  furthermore 
graduates  from  the  same university program within  a  year  (Cohen  et  al.  2008). Average  abnormal  returns  are  estimated based on  the market model 
around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to 
one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates 
being  less  than 5%. Vote Share  (Winners) and Vote Share  (Losers)  refer  to  the vote  shares of winners and vote  shares of  losers,  respectively. Pairs of 
columns  from (1) to (8) respectively show results on the subsamples of Senate or House races, candidates belonging to the majority or minority  in the 
corresponding  chamber, democrats or  republicans, and non‐executive or executive directors. Columns  (9)  to  (12) examine  subsamples of  connections 
through Harvard & Yale Universities, Harvard University, and institutions that are alma mater of less or more than 50 individuals (sample's median) in the 
sample. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                      
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Subsample  Senators  House  Chamber Majority 
Chamber 
Minority  Democrats  Republicans 
Non‐
Executive 
Directors 
Executive 
Directors 
Harvard & 
Yale  Harvard 
Small 
Networks 
Large 
Networks 
                                      
Win/Loss  ‐0.0424  ‐0.0214  ‐0.0262  ‐0.0286  ‐0.0243  ‐0.0286  ‐0.0276  ‐0.0184  ‐0.0392  ‐0.0545  ‐0.0245  ‐0.0255 
  [0.0117]***  [0.0112]*  [0.0129]**  [0.0115]**  [0.0117]**  [0.0137]**  [0.00901]***  [0.0210]  [0.00849]***  [0.0117]***  [0.0113]**  [0.00985]** 
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R‐squared  0.015  0.004  0.008  0.008  0.004  0.008  0.007  0.003  0.017  0.012  0.005  0.009 
Obs  559  1,260  893  926  1,057  762  1,493  326  449  215  1,092  727 
                                      
Table 5: Connections on Social Networks of Alumni 
                     This  table  reports  pooled  RDD  regressions  of  the  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  among  the  alumni‐network  politically  connected  firms  around  close 
elections  for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a  firm’s director  to a candidate  finishing  first or  second  in a close 
election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the  same university program without  restriction on year of graduation  (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal 
returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) 
period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin 
of votes between the top two candidates, with an x% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than x% vote margin. Vote Share (Winners) and 
Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of  losers, respectively. Column (3) controls  for a quartic polynomial  in vote share, 
separately for  losers and winners. Column (4) controls for dummy variables representing party, gender, incumbency and senate/house race information of 
the politician  involved. Column  (5)  controls  for  firm's market  value. Columns  (6),  (7)  and  (8)  control  respectively  for  fixed  effects  of  years,  SIC  2‐digit 
industries, and educational institutions. Column (9) excludes observations with CAR of 50% or higher. Column (10) runs a local cubic polynomial regression 
of  the dependent variable on vote  shares  in a  subsample above  the cutoff and a  subsample below  the cutoff,  then calculates  the difference between  the 
predicted  values  of  the  dependent  variable  for  each  subsample  around  the  cutoff.  Standard  errors  in  square  brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by 
politicians  in  each  election,  except  in  column  (10)  where  clustering  does  not  matter.  *,  **  and  ***  denote  statistical  significance  at  10%,  5%  and  1%, 
respectively. 
                                
   Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Subsample  1% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  No Outliers  Non‐Param. 
                     
Win/Lose  ‐0.0029  ‐0.0058  ‐0.0121  ‐0.0054  ‐0.0058  ‐0.0036  ‐0.0057  ‐0.0058  ‐0.0052  ‐0.0138 
  [0.0036]  [0.0028]**  [0.0060]**  [0.0024]**  [0.0024]**  [0.0027]  [0.0028]**  [0.0034]*  [0.0023]**  [0.0042]*** 
                     
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  ‐ 
                     
Controls      Full Poly 
Politician 
Variables  Market Value  Year FE  Industry FE  School FE    ‐ 
                     
R‐squared  0  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.012  0.017  0.015  0.001  ‐ 
Obs  5,656  29,527  29,527  29,063  29,527  29,527  29,527  29,527  29,330  29,527 
                                
 Table 6: Alternative Event Windows around Election Day 
           This  table  reports  pooled  RDD  regressions  of  the  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  and  Standardized 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections for US Senate 
and Congress between 2000 and 2008 for alternative event study windows. Each observation pairs a firm’s 
director  to a candidate  finishing  first or  second  in a close election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the 
same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated based 
on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over 
a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period.  Standardized CAR  is CAR  normalized  by  volatility  during  the  event  period. 
Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. 
A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote 
Share  (Winners)  and Vote  Share  (Losers)  refer  to  the  vote  shares  of winners  and  vote  shares  of  losers, 
respectively. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
           
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
                    
  Dependent Variables: CAR 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Window  (‐7,‐1)  (‐1,1)  (‐1,5)  (0,5)  (1,5)  (6,20) 
             
Win/Lose  0.00174  ‐0.0155  ‐0.0265  ‐0.0182  ‐0.0185  0.0139 
  [0.0165]  [0.00649]**  [0.00853]***  [0.00947]*  [0.00802]**  [0.0220] 
             
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R‐squared  0.003  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.005  0.002 
Obs  1,804  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819 
                    
           
Panel B: Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
                    
  Dependent Variables: SCAR 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Window  (‐7,‐1)  (‐1,1)  (‐1,5)  (0,5)  (1,5)  (6,20) 
             
Win/Lose  0.032  ‐0.25  ‐0.322  ‐0.261  ‐0.290  0.0616 
  [0.208]  [0.127]**  [0.125]**  [0.143]*  [0.129]**  [0.142] 
             
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R‐squared  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.000 
Obs  1,464  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819 
                    
Table 7: RDD with Nonparametric Regressions and Tests 
                       This table reports nonparametric RDD regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for US  Senate  and Congress between  2000  and  2008. Each observation pairs  a  firm’s director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first or  second  in  a  close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based  on  the market model  around  the  election  day  (Day  0). The market model  is  estimated  using  daily  data  over  a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period. 
Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. Each column consists of running a local 
cubic polynomial  regression  of  the dependent  variable  on  vote  shares  in  a  subsample  above  the  cutoff  and  a  subsample below  the  cutoff,  then 
calculating the difference between the predicted values of the dependent variable for each subsample around the cutoff. The first column shows the 
result for the realistic cutoff of 50%. Columns (2) to (5) show the results for different values of the bandwidth. Columns (6) to (9) show results with 
hypothetical cutoffs. Standard errors are in square brackets; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                   
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   Benchmark    Robustness to Bandwidths    Placebo Thresholds 
Bandwidth  0.05    0.04  0.03  0.02  0.01               
Cutoff  50%     50%  50%  50%  50%     48%  49%  51%  52% 
                       
Win/Lose  ‐0.034    ‐0.034  ‐0.0342  ‐0.0345  ‐0.0387    0.0805  0.0128  0.0465  0.0234 
  [0.0168]**    [0.0168]**  [0.0167]**  [0.0168]**  [0.0180]**    [0.0235]***  [0.0207]  [0.0283]  [0.0218] 
                                   
Table 8: Value of Political Connections across Subsamples of States by Regulation, Corruption and Institution Quality 
               This table reports RDD regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections for US Senate 
and Congress  between  2000  and  2008. Each  observation  pairs  a  firm’s director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first  or  second  in  a  close  election, who 
furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the 
market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy 
variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the 
top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, 
respectively. Columns (1) to (10) respectively show results on the subsamples of  above or below median of the following measures: regulation score, 
corruption conviction rate in 2000 (Glaeser Saks 2006), Exalead.com 2009 search hits for “corruption” close to name of main city, normalized by hits 
for name of main city, Newslibrary.com 2009 all newspapers search hits for “corruption” close to name of state, normalized by hits for name of state, 
and GCISC 1970 score (population concentration around the State capital, Campante Do 2010). Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for 
clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Subsample  High Regulation 
Low 
Regulation 
More 
Corrupt 
Conviction 
Rate 
Less 
Corrupt 
Conviction 
Rate 
More 
Corrupt 
Main City 
Less 
Corrupt 
Main City 
More 
Corrupt 
State 
Less 
Corrupt 
State 
High 
GCISC 
1970 
Low GCISC 
1970 
                     
Win/Lose  ‐0.0327  ‐0.0127  ‐0.0430  ‐0.0135  ‐0.0531  ‐0.00740  ‐0.0309  ‐0.0213  ‐0.0205  ‐0.0360 
  [0.0123]***  [0.0113]  [0.0132]***  [0.0113]  [0.0148]***  [0.0115]  [0.0125]**  [0.0122]*  [0.0110]*  [0.0136]*** 
                     
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and Vote 
Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                     
R‐squared  0.012  0.003  0.011  0.004  0.014  0.004  0.009  0.004  0.005  0.008 
Obs  1,166  653  852  967  872  947  1,081  738  905  914 
                                
 
Table 9: Value of Political Connections across Subsamples of Firms 
This table reports RDD regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected 
firms around close elections for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a 
firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second in a close election, who furthermore graduates from 
the  same university program within a year  (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal  returns are estimated 
based on  the market model around  the election day  (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily 
data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician 
finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top 
two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of 
winners  and  vote  shares  of  losers,  respectively.  Columns  (1)  to  (4)  respectively  show  results  on  the 
subsamples of below or above median market capitalization, with or without reliance on external  finance 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998). Column (5) uses the subsample of firms below median market capitalization and 
with  reliance  on  external  finance.  Standard  errors  in  square  brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by 
politicians  in  each  election.  Column  (6)  refers  to  the  subsample  with  the  distance  between  firm’s 
headquarter  and  politician’s  State  within  the  lowest  quartile,  and  above  median  corruption  score  by 
Newslibrary search hits  in politician’s State (see Table 6). Column (7) refers to the subsample with above 
median dependence on external finance and above median corruption score by Newslibrary search hits in 
politician’s State.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                       
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Subsample  Lower Market Cap 
Higher 
Market Cap 
Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Not Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Lower Market 
Cap, Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Short HQ 
Distance, 
More Corrupt 
Rely on 
External 
Finance, More 
Corrupt 
               
Win/Lose  ‐0.0656  0.000202  ‐0.0299  ‐0.0217  ‐0.0564  ‐0.0718  ‐0.0377 
  [0.0197]***  [0.00911]  [0.0128]**  [0.0148]  [0.0198]***  [0.0223]***  [0.0185]** 
               
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
R‐squared  0.023  0.004  0.010  0.004  0.025  0.034  0.015 
Obs  763  1,056  948  871  511  359  550 
                       
Table 10: Political Connections and Firms Activities in Corresponding States 
                 This table reports RDD regressions of the change  in  firm activities among the politically connected  firms 
around close elections for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s 
director  to a candidate  finishing  first or  second  in a close election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the 
same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Firm activities in a given state in a given year are 
measured as "Firms Reported In Local Newspapers" (FRILN), the ratio of the number of search hits for the 
firm's name  in  local newspapers and the number of search hits for the neutral keyword "September". The 
dependant variable  is  the change of FRILN over different event windows, with year 0 being  the election 
year. Win/Lose  is a dummy variable equal  to one  if and only  if a politician  finishes  first or second  in an 
election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 
5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of 
losers,  respectively. Columns  (1)  to  (3)  limit  the  sample  to  challengers with  recent  state  level  positions, 
respectively with windows of one year after, one year before, and two years after the election year. Column 
(4) further restricts the sample to those with experience in state's legislative bodies or as governors, within 
one year after the election. Columns (5) to (6) consider challengers coming from  federal offices and from 
other  backgrounds,  respectively.  Standard  errors  in  square  brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by 
politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                          
  Challengers with State Experience    
Challengers 
with Top 
State 
Experience 
  
From 
Federal 
Offices 
From 
Others 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)     (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable: 
Year‐to‐Year Change 
in Activities 
(0,+1)  (‐1,0)  (+1,+2)     (0,+1)     (0,+1)  (0,+1) 
                 
Win/Lose  ‐0.00957  0.000225  ‐0.00284  ‐0.0154    0.00145  ‐0.0405 
  [0.00435]**  [0.00559]  [0.00434]  [0.00253]***    [0.000981]  [0.0476] 
                 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes 
                 
R‐squared  0.01  0.005  0.002  0.009    0.128  0.002 
Obs  593  591  593  402    144  479 
                          
 
 
Table A1: Additional Robustness Checks 
This table reports robustness checks of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) among the politically connected firms around close elections for US 
Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. In columns (1) to (6) each observation pairs a firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second in a 
close election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). The outcome variable is raw returns 
from the window (‐1,5) in columns (1) and (2), CARs calculated from Fama‐French model in columns (3) and (4), CARs calculated from Fama‐French 
model with momentum in columns (5) and (6). Those models are estimated around the electionday (Day 0) using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) 
period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the 
margin of votes between  the  top  two candidates, with an x% margin referring to  the subsample of elections with  less than x% vote margin. Vote 
Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns (7)  to (9) collapse the 
data so  that each unit of observation  is  respectively a director, a company, or a politician.  In column (10)  the benchmark  regression  in Table  1  is 
estimated with two‐way clustering of both Politician‐Year and Company‐Year (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2011). Standard errors in square brackets 
are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                         
Dependent 
Variable 
CAR (‐1,5) Raw Returns     CAR(‐1,5) from FF     CAR(‐1,5) from FFM     CAR (‐1,5) 
(1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Sample  5% margin  5% margin    5% margin  5% margin    5% margin  5% margin   
Director 
Level 
Company 
Level 
Politician 
Level 
2‐way 
clustering: 
Pol. & Com. 
                 
                       
Win/Lose  ‐0.0204  ‐0.0445  ‐0.0228  ‐0.0248  ‐0.0261  ‐0.0270  ‐0.0306  ‐0.0287  ‐0.0271  ‐0.0261 
[0.0190]  [0.0211]**  [0.00774]***  [0.0101]**  [0.00725]***  [0.00949]***  [0.00917]***  [0.00819]***  [0.0196]  [0.00759]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   
School FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐squared  0.012  0.147  0.005  0.083  0.005  0.083  0.006  0.005  0.013  0.005 
Obs  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,818  1,818  1,308  1,593  192  1,818 
                                         
Table A2: RDD Randomness Checks 
This  table  reports  robustness checks of  the near‐randomness of  the win/lose  treatment  induced by close 
elections for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to a 
candidate finishing first or second in a close election, who furthermore graduates from the same university 
program within  a  year  (Cohen  et  al. 2008). Win/Lose  is  a dummy  variable  equal  to one  if  and only  if  a 
politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between 
the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote 
shares of winners  and  vote  shares of  losers,  respectively. Each  column  serves  to  show  that  a dependent 
variable's distribution  is continuous at  the cutoff point of 50% vote share. These dependent variables are 
those used as control variable in Tables 1‐10 in the main text. Panel A shows results for politician's gender, 
age, chamber, logarithm of campaign contribution, logarithm of number of contributors, and incumbency. 
Panel B considers challenger's party and different backgrounds, director's age, gender and executive/non‐
executive role, and social network size. Panel C displays results with different firm characteristics. Panel D 
reports  regressions  with  industry's  financial  dependence,  state's  institution  quality  and  corruption 
measured  in  different  ways  (see  text  for  details).  Standard  errors  in  square  brackets  are  corrected  for 
clustering by politicians  in each election.  *,  ** and  *** denote  statistical  significance at  10%, 5% and  1%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Politician Characteristics 
                    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable:  Pol. Gender  Pol. Age  Senate/House 
Log(Campaign 
Contribution) 
Log(Number of 
Contributors)  Incumbency 
Win/Lose  0.0999  2.673  0.103  ‐0.0644  ‐0.370  ‐0.177 
[0.116]  [2.086]  [0.224]  [0.655]  [0.395]  [0.202] 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R‐squared  0.023  0.030  0.019  0.004  0.014  0.029 
Obs  1,817  1,797  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819 
                    
 
B. Challenger and Director Characteristics 
                          
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable: Challengers' Party 
Challengers 
from State 
Politics 
Challengers 
with Top 
State 
Experience 
Challengers 
from 
Federal 
Politics 
Director's 
Gender 
Director's 
Age 
Executive 
Directorship 
Large 
Social 
Network 
Win/Lose  ‐0.192  ‐0.382  ‐4.943  ‐0.291  ‐0.0300  2.685  0.0779  ‐0.143 
[0.268]  [0.276]  [4.730]  [0.239]  [0.0412]  [2.049]  [0.0475]  [0.194] 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R‐squared  0.066  0.055  0.129  0.058  0.004  0.033  0.003  0.023 
Obs  1,221  1,221  1,221  1,221  1,819  1,722  1,819  1,819 
                          
C. Firm Characteristics 
                    
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable:  Market Cap  Common Equities  Assets 
Return on 
Asset 
Capital 
Expenditure  Leverage 
                 
Win/Lose  3,291  604.8  ‐1,522  ‐0.0318  ‐0.0566  ‐0.0272 
[3,255]  [1,055]  [10,321]  [0.0225]  [0.0361]  [0.0426] 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share (Losers)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R‐squared  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.000 
Obs  1,786  1,751  1,752  1,690  1,688  1,745 
                    
 
 
D. Industry and State Characteristics 
                    
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable: 
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
GCISC 
1970  Regulation 
Corruption 
Main City 
Corruption 
Conviction 
Rate 
Corruption 
State 
                 
Win/Lose  ‐0.115  0.0192  ‐0.0621  12,339  ‐0.0873  4.974 
[0.709]  [0.0388]  [0.182]  [7,746]  [0.0758]  [62.35] 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share (Losers)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R‐squared  0.003  0.060  0.070  0.039  0.015  0.025 
Obs  1,715  1,780  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,550 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects from Quantile Regressions for Challengers from State 
Politics 
This  table  reports  pooled  RDD  regressions  of  the  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  among  the  politically 
connected  firms  around  close  elections  for  US  Senate  and  Congress  between  2000  and  2008.  Each 
observation pairs a  firm’s director  to a candidate (incumbent or challenger)  finishing  first or second  in a 
close election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the same university program within a year  (Cohen et al. 
2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). 
The market model  is  estimated using daily data  over  a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period. Win/Lose  is  a dummy 
variable equal  to one  if and only  if a politician  finishes  first or  second  in an election. A close election  is 
specified  by  the  margin  of  votes  between  the  top  two  candidates,  with  an  x%  margin  referring  to  the 
subsample of elections with less than x% vote margin. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer 
to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Column (1) reports the estimation using 
median regression (50% quantile), while columns (2) to (5) report the estimation using quantile regressions 
at  the  1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quantiles. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported  in square brackets. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Subsample  Median 5% margin  1st quintile  2nd quintile  3rd quintile  4th quintile 
              
Win/Lose  ‐0.0353  ‐0.0759  ‐0.0343  ‐0.0142  ‐0.0125 
[0.0105]***  [0.0276]***  [0.0127]***  [0.00889]  [0.0193] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) and Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  594  594  594  594  594 
                 
 
